Whistleblowers and Outcomes of Financial Misrepresentation Enforcement Actions (Journal of Accounting Research 2018)

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Contents

Article

Authors Title Journal Year Edition Pages JEL Codes Keywords
Andrew C. Call, Gerald S. Martin, Nathan Y. Sharp, Jaron H. Wilde Whistleblowers and Outcomes of Financial Misrepresentation Enforcement Actions Journal of Accounting Research 2018 1 123-71 G38, K22, K42, M40, M41, M48 Whistleblowers, Enforcement actions, Fraud, Penalties, Financial reporting, Securities and Exchange Commission

Article information

Program code Data Readme Method(s) & estimation Data type Data used Origin of data used Software used (Version)
- - - - - - - -

Replication of this study

Authors Title Journal Year Edition Pages JEL Codes Keywords Replication type Replication result [refer to replication type 1 and 2] Raw data Call into question Authors statement
Emre Kuvvet Are a Few Huge Outcomes Distorting Financial Misconduct Research? EJW 2019 1 1–34 C18, G30, G38, K22, K42, M48 Whistleblower, Tipster, Outlier - - - - -

References

DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12177 IDEAS: a/bla/joares/v56y2018i1p123-171.html EconPapers: RePEc:bla:joares:v:56:y:2018:i:1:p:123-171


Reply: A Response to “Are a Few Huge Outcomes Distorting Financial Misconduct Research?”, Andrew C. Call, Nathan Y. Sharp, and Jaron H. Wilde, Econ Journal Watch 2019(1), 35–36.

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