Testing Mixed-Strategy Equilibria When Players Are Heterogeneous: The Case of Penalty Kicks in Soccer (AER 2002)

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Contents

Article

Authors Title Journal Year Edition Pages JEL Codes Keywords
P.-A. Chiappori, S. Levitt, T. Groseclose Testing Mixed-Strategy Equilibria When Players Are Heterogeneous: The Case of Penalty Kicks in Soccer AER 2002 4 1138 - 1151 -

Article information

Program code Data Readme Method(s) & estimation Data type Data used Origin of data used Software used (Version)
0 - not available online 0 - not available online 0 - not available online game theory model "similar to the matching pennies game" Micro data set of 459 penalty kicks: every penalty kick in the French First league over two years (1997-1999) as well as every penalty from the First Italian league over three years (1997-2000); 162 different kickers and 88 different goalies - -

Replication of this study

Authors Title Journal Year Edition Pages JEL Codes Keywords Replication type Replication result [refer to replication type 1 and 2] Raw data Call into question Authors statement

References

DOI: 10.1257/00028280260344678 IDEAS: a/aea/aecrev/v92y2002i4p1138-1151.html EconPapers: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:92:y:2002:i:4:p:1138-1151


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