How do staggered boards affect shareholder value? Evidence from a natural experiment (JFE 2013)

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Contents

Article

Authors Title Journal Year Edition Pages JEL Codes Keywords
Alma Cohen, Charles C.Y. Wang How do staggered boards affect shareholder value? Evidence from a natural experiment JFE 2013 3 627-41 G14, G34, K22 Corporate governance, Staggered board, Takeover, Defense, Antitakeover provision, Proxy fight, Tobin's firm value, Agency cost, Delaware, Chancery Court, Airgas

Article information

Program code Data Readme Method(s) & estimation Data type Data used Origin of data used Software used (Version)
- - - - - SharkRepellent data set of FactSet Research Systems, cross section of US-based firms listed on, New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), NYSE Amex, NYSE ARCA, Nasdaq, or Nasdaq Capital Market current as of October 12, 2010, November 2010 stock prices and returns from, Datastream, and PERMNO identifiers and historical returns from, Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), GVKEY identifiers, Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) industry classification codes, most recently available annual financial statement information from, Compustat USA -

Replication of this study

Authors Title Journal Year Edition Pages JEL Codes Keywords Replication type Replication result [refer to replication type 1 and 2] Raw data Call into question Authors statement
Yakov Amihud, Stoyan Stoyanov Do staggered boards harm shareholders? JFE 2017 2 432-9 G14, G34, K22 Staggered board, Classified board, Corporate governance, Antitakeover measures, Takeover defense, Airgas - - - - -

References

DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.08.005 IDEAS: a/eee/jfinec/v110y2013i3p627-641.html EconPapers: RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:110:y:2013:i:3:p:627-641


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