Detecting Bidders Groups in Collusive Auctions (AEJ:MI 2016)

From ReplicationWiki
Jump to: navigation, search
How revelant do you consider a replication of this study? You may discuss on the discussion page.


Nobody voted on this yet

 You need to enable JavaScript to vote


Here you find a ranking of the studies that are regarded most relevant to be replicated.

Contents

Article

Authors Title Journal Year Edition Pages JEL Codes Keywords
Timothy G. Conley, Francesco Decarolis Detecting Bidders Groups in Collusive Auctions AEJ:MI 2016 2 1-38 D44, D47, H57, R42 -

Article information

Program code Data Readme Method(s) & estimation Data type Data used Origin of data used Software used (Version)
1 - accessible on journal website 1 - accessible on journal website 1 - accessible on journal website Ordinary least squares (OLS), Clustering, Probit, Fixed effects (FE) - 1, 034 auctions held by counties and municipalities November 2005-May 2010, contracts involved procurement of simple roadwork jobs (mostly paving jobs, worth below €1 million) and were held in five Northern regions, Piedmont, Liguria, Lombardy, Veneto, Emilia-Romagna, legal office of the municipality of Turin Italy Stata, MATLAB

Replication of this study

Authors Title Journal Year Edition Pages JEL Codes Keywords Replication type Replication result [refer to replication type 1 and 2] Raw data Call into question Authors statement

References

DOI: 10.1257/mic.20130254 IDEAS: a/aea/aejmic/v8y2016i2p1-38.html EconPapers: RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:8:y:2016:i:2:p:1-38


Personal tools
Namespaces

Variants
Actions
Navigation
Toolbox