Competition in Treasury Auctions (AEJ:MI 2019)

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Authors Title Journal Year Edition Pages JEL Codes Keywords
Helmut Elsinger, Philipp Schmidt-Dengler, Christine Zulehner Competition in Treasury Auctions AEJ:MI 2019 1 157-84 D44, E63, G21, H63 Treasury auctions, Multi-unit auctions, Independent private values, Competition, Bidder surplus, Auction format

Article information

Program code Data Readme Method(s) & estimation Data type Data used Origin of data used Software used (Version)
1 - accessible on journal website 0 - not available online 1 - accessible on journal website - - Austrian Treasury,, Österreichische Kontrollbank,, anonymized in availabe dataset Austria, Germany Stata, MATLAB

Replication of this study

Authors Title Journal Year Edition Pages JEL Codes Keywords Replication type Replication result [refer to replication type 1 and 2] Raw data Call into question Authors statement


DOI: 10.1257/mic.20170039 IDEAS: a/aea/aejmic/v11y2019i1p157-84.html EconPapers: RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:11:y:2019:i:1:p:157-84

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