Are a Few Huge Outcomes Distorting Financial Misconduct Research? (EJW 2019)

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Contents

Article

Authors Title Journal Year Edition Pages JEL Codes Keywords
Emre Kuvvet Are a Few Huge Outcomes Distorting Financial Misconduct Research? EJW 2019 1 1–34 C18, G30, G38, K22, K42, M48 Whistleblower, Tipster, Outlier

Article information

Program code Data Readme Method(s) & estimation Data type Data used Origin of data used Software used (Version)
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This article is a replication of

Authors Title Journal Year Edition Pages JEL Codes Keywords Replication type Replication result [refer to replication type 1 and 2] Raw data Call into question Authors statement
Andrew C. Call, Gerald S. Martin, Nathan Y. Sharp, Jaron H. Wilde Whistleblowers and Outcomes of Financial Misrepresentation Enforcement Actions Journal of Accounting Research 2018 1 123-71 G38, K22, K42, M40, M41, M48 Whistleblowers, Enforcement actions, Fraud, Penalties, Financial reporting, Securities and Exchange Commission - - - - -

References

DOI: - IDEAS: a/ejw/journl/v16y2019i1p1-34.html EconPapers: RePEc:ejw:journl:v:16:y:2019:i:1:p:1-34


Reply: A Response to “Are a Few Huge Outcomes Distorting Financial Misconduct Research?”, Andrew C. Call, Nathan Y. Sharp, and Jaron H. Wilde, Econ Journal Watch 2019(1), 35–36.

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